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Abstract  
This study involves a financial analysis of 43 publicly listed and large private companies in 
the building and construction supply chain from 2005 to 2010; straddling the period of the 
global financial crisis (GFC); and examines the impact of the GFC on the performance of 
these companies. The construction supply chain was divided into four sectors – material 
suppliers, construction companies, property developers and real estate investment trusts 
(REITs). The findings indicate that the impact was minimal for both material suppliers and 
construction companies, but especially severe for the more leveraged property developers 
and REITs. Building material suppliers and construction companies have benefitted 
substantially from the building economic stimulus packages provided by the Australian 
government to mitigate the effects of the GFC. Decreases in the valuation of assets have, to 
a large extent, reduced the profitability of property developers and REITs during the GFC but 
these companies have recovered quickly from these adverse conditions to return to a sound 
financial position by the end of the 2010 financial year. The results will inform investors, 
construction company managers and construction professionals in devising strategies for 
prudent financial management and for weathering future financial crises. 
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Introduction 
The global financial crisis (GFC) is commonly believed to have begun in July 2007 when a 
loss of confidence by American investors in the value of sub-prime mortgages caused a 
liquidity crisis. By September 2008, the crisis had worsened with a sudden dramatic decline 
of stock prices around the globe. With a large number of borrowers defaulting on loans, 
banks were faced with a situation where the repossessed house and land was worth less on 
the market than the bank had loaned out originally. When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 
September 2008, governments around the world struggled to rescue large financial 
institutions as the fallout from the housing and stock market collapse worsened.  
 
The Australian equity market was no different to many other countries in facing the GFC. 
The S&P/ASX200 index fell from a peak of 6700 in late 2007 to 3400 in November 2008. It 
was initially thought that Australia would fare much better as the local banks’ exposure to 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) was relatively small in comparison with other 
countries. The housing market was also in a strong position with non-conforming loans in 
Australia accounting for only about 1% compared to 13% in the U.S. (Debelle 2008).  
 
Despite the smaller exposure to toxic debts and a stronger housing market, the Australian 
gross domestic product (GDP) declined in the December quarter of 2008. Building 
construction commencements had reduced by 10% in the September 2008 quarter in 
response to the tightening of credit. Total building output for three subsequent quarters 
reduced as a consequence of the diminishing building commencements. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the change in GDP, building commencements and building output for each quarter 
between 2005 and 2010. The Australian property market was no different from any other 
industry facing the GFC. From the December 2007 quarter to the December 2008 quarter, 
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owner occupied housing commitments fell by 22% (ABS 2010). This can be attributed to an 
increase in the unemployment rate during that period, and reduced confidence in the market. 
A market report states that office property developers in Australia experienced a 20.6% 
decline in their revenue for the financial year 2007-08 (IBISWorld 2011a). The retail market 
was also affected, resulting from reduced consumer spending.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Changes in GDP, building starts and building volume (ABS 2010; ABS 2011) 
 
Australia’s Response to the GFC 
The first significant macroeconomic policy response to the global financial crisis came from 
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). On October 7, 2008, the RBA Board cut interest rates 
by 100 basis points to 6%. On October 12, the Australian Government announced it would 
guarantee all Australian bank deposits. Two days later, the Government announced an 
AUD10.4 billion stimulus package that included AUD1.5 billion to support housing 
construction. The housing aspect of the stimulus package – a time-limited grant to first home 
buyers – took effect immediately. To prepare for the possibility that the global financial crisis 
might be deeper and longer lasting than expected, the Government brought forward the 
commencement of large-scale infrastructure projects with a first tranche worth AUD4.7 billion 
announced in early December. On February 3, 2009 the Australian Government announced 
a second AUD42 billion stimulus package titled the Nation Building and Jobs Plan. As the 
global recession was expected to be deep and long, infrastructure spending played the 
central role with 70% of the second stimulus package to be spent on schools (AUD14.7 
billion), social and defence housing (AUD6.6 billion), energy efficiency measures (AUD3.9 
billion), and AUD890 million on road, rail and small-scale community infrastructure projects. 
More recent steps were contained in the 2009-10 Budget delivered in May 2009 where the 
Government introduced the third phase in its infrastructure program where an additional 
AUD22 billion was announced. The large increases in building starts in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2009 resulted from the initiation of stimulus packages earlier in the year. The 
Building the Education Revolution (BER), the single largest element of the Australian 
Government’s Nation Building - Economic Stimulus Plan accounted for 23,600 projects.  
 
These developments provided the motivation to develop a broader understanding of the 
effects of this recent financial crisis on the construction supply chain. The analysis focused 
on characterizing the impact of the GFC on the financial performance of companies within 
four sectors of the industry: building material suppliers, building contractors, property 
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developers and Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs). The key points 
examined are the severity of the impact by means of ratio analysis, changes in cost structure 
and financial distress. The predicament of firms that were most affected was discussed in 
order to explore possible common characteristics of distress or failure. The findings will 
inform investors, managers and construction professionals in devising strategies for prudent 
financial management and for weathering future financial crises. 
 
Background 
Investigations into the financial performance of construction companies were initially 
reported in the 1970’s. Sales turnover was identified to have a great impact on the 
profitability of the enterprise (Fadel 1977). A detailed industry level analysis of UK 
construction industry identified the similarities and differences in profits across general 
contractors and home builders (Akintoye and Skitmore 1991). Pre-tax profit margins among 
eighty general contractors hovered around 3.23% over the analysed period. Though 
uncorrelated with firm size, home builders’ profit margin was observed to be four times more 
than general contractors. Low (1997) examined the performance of property companies in 
the Singapore stock exchange over a period of twenty one years and concluded that their 
performance was not better than the stock market and was highly correlated with the 
property market itself. Other researchers yielded the same findings in different countries 
(Abdul-Rasheed and Tajudeen 2006). On the contrary, Balatbat et al. (2011) reported that 
the performance of thirty Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed construction firms 
operating in civil infrastructure, residential and non-residential sectors over a 10 year period 
performed better than the All Ordinaries Index and a pool of blue chip companies. This was 
due to construction companies’ higher efficiency in the utilisation of assets for revenue 
generation. A study (Cheah et al. 2004) on global construction firms indicates that business 
strategy has to account for efficiency in financial, operational, technical and human factors, 
and that corporate failure was largely due to failures in or two critical factors. 
 
It is generally accepted practice to assess company performance using financial ratios – the 
analysis of these ratios over a period of time may provide substantial and reliable information 
on a company’s financial health. Early statistical models based on these financial ratios were 
developed to analyse company failures. Beaver (1966) identified differences based on thirty 
financial ratios among groups of failed and non-failed firms as early as five years before the 
firms failed. The differences became more significant as firms approached failure. Altman 
(1968) combined ratio analysis and multiple discriminant analysis to formulate a statistical 
tool for prediction of company failure. This methodology analysed a combination of ratios, 
thereby eliminating possibilities of uncertainty in relying on single ratios. From a sample of 
sixty six manufacturing companies, of which half of them had filed for bankruptcy from 1946-
1965, Altman derived a set of ratios covering liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency and 
activity ratios. Many variations of this model have been created over time for specific 
industry segments in various regions: construction in the UK (Mason and Harris 1979; 
Abidali and Harris 1995), and for construction in China (Ng et al. 2011). Macroeconomic 
factors such as low construction activity, high interest rates, rise in inflation, and reduction in 
consumer spending have been identified by researchers to be significant factors that can 
drive companies towards failure (Kangari 1988; Arditi et al. 2000). 
 
Both Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) are of the view that financial ratios, based solely on 
financial statements, are an indicator of a company’s past performance, and future 
performance is beyond prediction. Mason and Harris (1979) went on to declare that their 
model is able to identify companies that are 'at risk' of failure but cannot forecast whether a 
company will actually fail. It is worth pointing out at this stage that these tools only give an 
indication, and at any point changes in a company’s strategy can transform a company from 
poor performance to market dominance. Langford et al. (1993) recognised that these 
analytical tools, along with the company’s financial performance have to be used in 
combination for greater understanding of corporate performance. Similar views have been 
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echoed by Chan et al. (2005) when analysing the impact of the Asian financial crisis on 
construction companies in Hong Kong.  
 
Recent studies (Abdul-Rasheed and Tajudeen 2006, Chen 2009, Balatbat et al. 2010, 
Balatbat et al. 2011) have excluded building material suppliers and real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) in the review of financial performance, ignoring their importance within the 
building construction industry. An industry report estimates about 6,100 establishments to be 
operating in the materials supply sector in 2010-11 generating an estimated AUD20.5 billion 
in annual revenues (IBISWorld 2011b). Understanding the performance of the building 
material suppliers and REITs, in comparison with the builders and developers, is vital to the 
construction industry’s resilience to future market downturns.  
 
REITs came into existence in the US in 1960 (NAREIT 2011) to enable retail investors to 
invest in large scale real estate assets. Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) 
was established a decade later in 1971. The Australian Securities Exchange defines A-
REITs as professionally managed and diversified portfolio of commercial real estate. 
Investors gain exposure to both the value of the real estate the trust owns, and the regular 
rental income generated from the properties.  
 
Data and Methodology 
In this study, the supply chain for building construction was limited to 4 sectors: building 
material suppliers, building contractors, property developers and A-REITs. A list of 
companies in each sector was determined by examining companies listed in the Australian 
Securities Exchange under Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) capital goods 
and real estate industry groups. The next selection criteria for these companies were as 
follows to ensure that these companies were representative of the local economy; (i) listed in 
the ASX prior to 2006 financial year, (ii) more than 50% of their revenues were generated 
from Australian operations, and (iii) more than 50% of their revenue were generated from the 
sectors they represent, respectively. This filter resulted in a total of only 36 companies with 
only one operating exclusively as a building contractor. This is because most public listed 
building construction companies in Australia were concurrently operating in both construction 
and development. Hence in order to obtain a representative sample of the building 
contractors, the search was enlarged to include large (revenues exceeding AUD25 million) 
private construction companies that were required to file annual report to the Australian 
Security Investment Commission (ASIC). This search identified 51 companies of which only 
16 had filed Form 388 for the years 2006 to 2010. Among the 16, only 7 companies were 
predominantly engaged in building construction. The other firms that were involved in either 
development or infrastructure works along with construction were not taken into 
consideration. The lack of local investment opportunities has seen Australian REITs seeking 
international property investments in 2000s. While this strategy brings about diversification 
gains, international property introduces additional currency, political and economic risks. 
Many of the A-REITs with large total assets were excluded from this analysis as these 
comprised significant international properties. A full list of the companies analysed is listed in 
Table 1.  
 
The financial performance of all selected companies was calculated over the 2006-10 
period, both years inclusive. Despite its many drawbacks, the most precise information on 
these companies can only be determined by relying on audited financial statements 
(Langford et al. 1993). In order to assess the impact of the GFC on the performance of these 
companies, the values for every consecutive year was compared in a trend analysis. The 
cost structure for the four sectors has been examined with cost of goods sold (COGS), 
expenses, depreciation, amortization, interest and profit displayed as a percentage of 
revenue. Items such as rent, utilities, wages and purchases were not always discernable or 
available and were considered as part of expenses. A distress analysis was conducted using 
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the Altman’s Z-index (1968). This was considered to be the most appropriate model to 
compare the risk of failure across the four different sectors.  
 
Material Supplier  
Adelaide Brighton Limited (ASX:ABC) 
Alesco Corporation Limited (ASX:ALS) 
Boral Limited (ASX:BLD) 
Bluescope Steel Limited (ASX:BSL) 
Brickworks Limited (ASX:BKW) 
CSR Limited (ASX:CSR) 
Gunns Limited (ASX:GNS) 
GWA Group Limited (ASX:GWA) 
Reece Australia Limited (ASX:REH) 
Building Construction  
Badge Constructions (SA) Pty Ltd 
Hooker Cockram Corporation Pty Ltd  
J. Hutchinson Pty Ltd  
Masterton Corporation Holding Company Pty Ltd  
Pellicano Builders Pty Ltd 
Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd  
St.Hilliers Construction Pty Ltd  
Tamawood Limited (ASX:TWD) 
Property Developer  
AHC Limited (ASX:AHC) 
Australand Property Group (ASX:ALZ) 
AVJennings Limited (ASX:AVJ) 
Becton Property Group (ASX:BEC) 
Cedar Woods Properties Ltd (ASX:CWP) 
CIC Australia Limited (ASX:CNB) 
Devine Limited (ASX:DVN) 
Finbar Group Limited (ASX:FRI) 
FKP Property Group (ASX:FKP) 
Geo Property Group (ASX:GPM) 
International Equities Corp Ltd (ASX:IEQ) 
Lend Lease Group (ASX:LLC) 
Metroland Australia Limited (ASX:MTD) 
Mirvac Group (ASX:MGR) 
Payce Consolidated Limited (ASX:PAY) 
Peet Limited (ASX:PPC) 
Stockland (ASX:SGP) 
Sunland Group Limited (ASX:SDG) 
AREIT 
Abacus Property Group (ASX:ABP) 
APN Property Group Limited (ASX:APD) 
Aspen Group (ASX:APZ) 
BWP Trust (ASX:BWP) 
CFS Retail Property Trust (ASX:CFX) 
Charter Hall Group (ASX:CHC) 
Commonwealth Property (ASX:CPA) 
Cromwell Property Group (ASX:CMW) 
Goodman Group (ASX:GMG) 
GPT Group (ASX:GPT)  
Trafalgar Corporate Group (ASX:TGP) 
 
 
Table 1 List of Companies studied  
 
Performance Analysis of Companies  
The best gauge for measure of a recession, next to GDP is the stock market. The market 
index is a reliable tool to plot the timeline of recession right from start to recovery. The 
primary investable benchmark in Australia, the S&P/ASX200, fell from its peak of 6748 in 
October 2007 to 3145 in March 2009, losing 46% of its valuation. Since then the markets 
have recovered and remained fairly buoyant at 4500 until the end of 2010. With the market 
as a reliable pointer, the period of analysis has been set from financial year 2006 to 2010 to 
cater for the boom, fall and recovery due to the GFC in Australia. 
 
In terms of revenue, property developers and A-REITs exhibited significant decline in 
revenues in 2008 and 2009, and in the case of developers, continuing into 2010. The 
building material sector exhibited a marginal contraction of 2.8% in 2009 followed by a 
further reduction of nearly 7% in 2010. On the contrary, revenues for building contractors 
continued to increase, albeit by only 1.6% in 2009 and 0.8% in 2010 despite the slump in 
building starts in late 2008. The nature of the building construction business is that builders 
are not immediately affected by a downturn due to continuing construction projects awarded 
a couple of years earlier. The launch of a number of stimulus packages; bringing forward 
spending on large-scale infrastructure and additional spending on new school buildings in 
late 2008 and early 2009 by the Australian government to mitigate the effects of the GFC on 
the local construction market have maintained building starts at a level of AUD81.5 billion 
and AUD75.6 billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively (ABS 2010; ABS 2011). 
 
 Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building 
Thangaraj, R K and Chan, T K (2012) ‘The effects of the global financial crisis on the Australian building construction 
supply chain’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building, 12 (3) 16-30  
21 
Table 2 indicates that the total net assets of all the companies analysed have increased in 
the period examined. In fact, net assets for building contractors have more than doubled 
compared to 2006 with other sectors averaging an increase of 50%. This is not withstanding 
the small decreases in net assets for property developers and A-REITs that had to revalue 
some of their assets in 2009 and 2010. Net asset in this table is usually equal to the 
shareholders' equity in the company balance sheet or total assets minus total liabilities.  
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sales Revenue 
Building Material Suppliers 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
 19,926   20,961  
5.2% 
 24,454  
16.7% 
 23,775  
-2.8% 
 22,136  
-6.95 
Building Contractors  
(Change, % year-on-year) 
 1,506   2,068  
37.3% 
 2,455  
18.7% 
 2,495  
1.6% 
 2,514 
0.8%  
Property Developers 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
 7,205   9,323  
29.4% 
 7,827  
-16.1% 
 6,903  
-11.8% 
 6,810  
-1.4% 
A-REITs 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
 1,636   2,762  
68.8% 
 2,294  
-16.9% 
 1,331  
-42.0% 
 1,493  
12.2% 
Net Assets 
Building Material Suppliers 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
10,404  
 
11,936  
14.7% 
12,725  
6.6% 
15,105  
18.7% 
15,731  
4.1% 
Building Contractors  
(Change, % year-on-year) 
152  
 
248  
63.1% 
301  
21.2% 
329  
9.5% 
357  
8.4% 
Property Developers 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
13,137 
  
17,676 
34.6%  
18,760 
6.1%  
18,693 
-0.4%  
19,705 
5.4%  
A-REITs 
(Change, % year-on-year) 
6,187 
  
8,102  
30.9% 
10,134 
25.1%  
9,521  
-6.0% 
9,132 
-4.1%  
Table 2  Sales revenue and Net assets (AUD million) for years 2006 to 2010 
 
Ratios measuring profitability, liquidity, activity, leverage and solvency are generally 
accepted as the most significant indicators of corporate performance. Table 3 lists at least 
one financial ratio in each of the categories above to evaluate the performance of the 
companies in the building construction supply chain. These ratios were weighted based on 
the annual revenues of the respective companies. In terms of profitability, the net profit 
margin (net profit divided by sales revenue) for material suppliers reduced progressively 
from more than 7% in 2006 to 0.8% in 2010. Net profit margin for building contractors was 
low at between 3-4% in 2006 and 2007, and reduced to a minimum of 1.6% during the 
depths of the financial crisis. It recovered slightly to 1.9% in 2010. The net profit margin for 
property developers was more than 30% before the onset of the GFC, but converted into a 
59% loss in 2009. Similarly, A-REITs reported a net profit margin of 70% and 53% pre-GFC 
and a massive loss of 106% in 2009. Both the property developer and AREIT sectors 
returned to profitability and recovered to approximately one half their pre-GFC margins in 
2010.  
 
Return on average equity (ROE) measures the rate of return on the shareholders' equity and 
reflects the company’s efficiency at generating profits from every dollar of equity. Defined as 
net profits divided by average equity, the building material supplier sector exhibited returns 
between 13% and 17% during the period examined but dropped to a low of 0.2% during 
2009 when net profits were depressed by the effects of the GFC. Pre-GFC, the building 
contractors were achieving returns in excess of 40% but fell to 23.1% in 2008 and eventually 
to a low of 8.3% in 2010. This corresponded with the observed drop in net profit margin from 
more than 30% pre-GFC to less than 20% post-GFC. The property developers achieved an 
ROE of approximately 20% pre-GFC but suffered losses in 2009 to report an ROE of -24% 
during 2009 and recovering to a small 0.4% in 2010. The ROE for the A-REIT sector fell 
from 21% in 2006 to -13.9% at the pits of the GFC in 2009 but recovered when the sector 
returned to profitability in 2010.  
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The current ratio, defined as current assets divided by current liabilities, provides a measure 
of liquidity or the company's ability to pay back its short-term liabilities with cash, inventory 
and receivables. As can be seen from Table 3, the current ratios for both the building 
material suppliers and building contractors were between 1.5 and 1.9, indicating that these 
companies were adequately liquid and able to pay its obligations. The current ratios 
remained above 1.0 during the period of the financial crisis indicating that these companies 
were managing their cash flows prudently. A number of companies invested in additional 
property, plant and equipment, increasing debts and consequently reducing the current ratio 
slightly in 2008. Once the effects of the GFC were apparent, these companies sought ways 
to reduce their current liabilities with a slight improvement in current ratio in 2009. Property 
developers exhibited an increase in current ratios in 2007-08 as completed and unsold 
properties were accounted for under current inventories leading to a higher current asset 
value. Impairments to the value of properties in inventories and the increases in interest 
bearing liabilities resulted in higher current liabilities. These changes led to current ratios 
fluctuating between 1.4 and 2.3 during this period. The current ratio for AREITs ranged from 
0.66 to 1.33 during this period, but was not considered further as this sector invested 
primarily in properties - a non-current asset.  
 
Financial Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Building Material Suppliers 
Net profit margin 0.074 0.084 0.062 0.015 0.014 
Return on Average Equity 0.149 0.173 0.134 0.002 0.012 
Current Ratio 1.437 1.544 1.257 1.742 1.780 
Working Capital Turnover 11.760 9.430 54.230 8.224 6.770 
Quick Ratio 0.867 0.933 0.722 0.944 0.988 
Debt Ratio 0.540 0.491 0.524 0.432 0.415 
Times Interest Earned Ratio 93.172 12.231 10.252 3.604 8.059 
Building Contractors 
Net profit margin 0.034 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.019 
Return on Average Equity 0.477 0.439 0.231 0.122 0.083 
Current Ratio 1.479 1.504 1.472 1.636 1.466 
Working Capital Turnover 6.712 4.650 15.489 11.381 50.254 
Quick Ratio 1.104 1.018 1.034 1.181 1.074 
Debt Ratio 0.683 0.653 0.654 0.599 0.651 
Times Interest Earned Ratio 1525 6295 10194 816 48 
Property Developers 
Net profit margin 0.324 0.377 0.153 -0.587 0.144 
Return on Average Equity 0.203 0.189 0.069 -0.237 0.004 
Current Ratio 1.393 1.725 1.656 2.306 1.460 
Working Capital Turnover -2.214 0.911 -1.684 2.270 3.459 
Quick Ratio 0.454 0.778 0.602 1.367 0.726 
Debt Ratio 0.534 0.479 0.502 0.463 0.428 
Times Interest Earned Ratio 20.462 15.609 5.621 -15.014 8.088 
REITs 
Net profit margin 0.707 0.776 0.581 -1.057 0.371 
Return on Average Equity 0.210 0.222 0.134 -0.139 0.048 
Current Ratio 0.663 1.049 0.750 1.331 0.736 
Working Capital Turnover -1.227 -0.839 -0.083 -0.386 0.787 
Quick Ratio 0.643 0.897 0.702 1.210 0.646 
Debt Ratio 0.357 0.336 0.358 0.334 0.330 
Times Interest Earned Ratio 10.663 13.324 8.294 -9.515 2.749 
Table 3 Financial ratios (weighted on revenue) 
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The quick ratio, a more severe measure of liquidity, defines the company's ability to meet its 
short-term obligations with its most liquid assets. Inventory was excluded from the current 
assets because of the delays involved in turning inventory into cash. As expected, the quick 
ratios for material suppliers were less than the current ratio, but were observed to be slightly 
below 1.0 indicating that current liabilities were marginally higher than current assets. The 
increase in short term debt in 2008 resulted in a large drop in quick ratio to 0.722. Once 
these liabilities were restructured in response to the GFC, the quick ratio improved to 
previous levels. Recognising that building contractors operate on very tight but prudent cash 
flows, the quick ratios for this sector were all marginally above 1.0 during the entire period 
examined. The property developers and AREITs exhibited notably low quick ratios as 
properties were considered to be non-current assets. Again, some of these companies had 
to restructure their liabilities in 2009 leading to improved quick ratios for the year.  
 
The working capital turnover (WCT) ratio is an activity ratio which represents the number of 
times the working capital is turned over in the course of a year. A higher WCT ratio indicates 
the efficiency with which the working capital is being used to generate revenue. The building 
material suppliers exhibited a WCT ratio between 6.8 and 11.8 for the period examined 
except for 2008 when the ratio jumped to a high of 54. This was due to large current 
liabilities incurred by a number of companies leading to a reduced working capital. The large 
WCT ratio for building contractors between 2008 and 2010 was also due to reductions in 
working capital as the revenue was previously reported to be relatively constant over this 
period. The WCT ratio for both the property developers and AREITs did not provide much 
information as the values fluctuated between -2.2 and +3.5, most likely attributed to large 
changes in the levels of current assets and liabilities.  
 
The use of debt to finance the company’s assets was evaluated by examining the debt ratio 
which is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The debt ratios remained fairly 
constant over the entire period examined for all four sectors although the building 
contractors showed the highest debt ratio at 65% whereas the AREITs had the lowest ratio 
of approximately 33%. Building contractors exhibited comparatively higher debt ratios due to 
high levels of short term trade debts payable to sub-contractors. When the debt ratio was 
examined together with the Times Interest Earned (TIE) ratio, it clearly indicated that 
although the building contractors were most highly leveraged, the debt amounts were small 
relative to the net profits earned by these companies. Building contractors were obviously 
able to meet its debt obligations many times over. It can be inferred from an examination of 
the combination of debt and the TIE ratios that most of the liabilities of the AREITs business 
structure are long term debts whereas building contractors incur short term debts. The TIE 
ratio for building material suppliers reduced drastically from 93 in 2006 to 3.6 in 2009 due to 
a drop in net profits. The effect of the GFC was evident in two sectors; the property 
developers and AREITs, where a majority of these companies suffered losses in 2009 
leading to negative TIE ratios.  
 
Industry Cost Structure 
The industry cost structure was examined by comparing input costs to revenue for each 
sector. The cost of input materials (represented by cost of goods sold, COGS) and operating 
expenses are a significant component of the material supplier cost structure. From Figure 2a 
it can be observed that COGS and expenses have remained fairly consistent at 56-58% and 
29-30%, respectively, leading up to the GFC. Other costs such as depreciation, amortization 
and interest expense accounts for very small percentages of the total revenue. The most 
significant effect of the GFC is the drop in profit from 8% in 2007 to 1% in 2010.  
 
For the building construction sector, COGS represents close to 90% of total revenue with 
profits accounting for 3-4% pre-GFC as illustrated in Figure 2b. It can be seen that all the 
inputs have remained relatively stable with an evident squeeze on profits. Interest expense 
for the building construction sector is lowest amongst all four sectors at less than 0.1% 
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indicating that companies in this sector have insignificant bank loans. The cost structure for 
property developers include 70% for cost of goods and another 12-15% for operating 
expenses. Interest payments amount to approximately 3% of total revenues. In terms of 
profits, property development sector have reported large swings in figures in excess of 12% 
profit pre-GFC to losses amounting to approximately 20% of revenue in 2009. The increase 
in expenses was attributed to a write-down in the value of property assets held by these 
companies during the construction stage. It may be worthwhile to note that this sector 
recovered in 2010 reporting a profit of 7%. 
 
Property investment companies and REITs have been relatively quick to react to the GFC 
compared to the other sectors in the supply chain. This is clearly due to a drop in value of 
the financial assets held by the investment companies and trusts. REITs operate in a similar 
manner as investment funds and do not report COGS. Interest payments amount to 
approximately 10% as this sector is heavily reliant on debt to finance the purchase of real 
estate assets. Figure 2d clearly indicates that REITs were amongst the most severely 
affected with a reported cost structure nearly three times that of the total revenue for 2009. 
This sector exhibited the highest profit margins with pre-GFC profit levels at 66% of total 
revenue. A decline was seen in the 2008 financial year, when the effects of the GFC started 
to affect the bottom line with a loss of 27%, and continuing the decline with a loss amounting 
to nearly 200% of total revenue in 2009. The effect of the GFC was two-fold: a loss of 
confidence in the property market meant that real estate valuations plunged requiring these 
investment companies and trusts to write-down assets values; and a drop in occupancy 
leading to a sharp decline in revenue. 
 
Distress Analysis  
Altman (1968) used the multiple discriminant analysis model to combine several financial 
ratios into a single index, called the ‘distress score’ to discriminate between failed and no-
failed groups. Altman’s proposed Z-score, based on an analysis of 66 manufacturing 
companies of which 33 had failed in 1946, estimated the risk of bankruptcy within a period of 
two to three years. This analysis was performed to investigate the possibility of business 
failures in response to the GFC. 
 
Table 4 indicates that building contractors have remained fairly stable and well above the ‘at 
risk’ score of 2.7 throughout the period of study. Material suppliers on the other hand 
exhibited excellent scores for 2006-08 but dipped slightly into the ‘at risk’ score for 2009-10 
having suffered a drop in revenue and market value. Property developers and REITs were 
categorised as ‘at risk’ before the onset of the GFC but fell below the ‘imminent failure’ 
threshold of 1.8 in 2008. On examining the individual factors for the Z-score, it is clear that 
the fall from the safe level for property developers and REITs in 2008 has been influenced 
by a loss in profitability and productivity. 
 
 
(a) Material suppliers 
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(b) Construction 
 
 
(c) Property developers 
 
 
 
(d) REITs 
 
Figure 2 Cost structure for material suppliers, construction, property developers  
and REIT sectors (weighted based on revenue) 
 
Property developers and REITs with higher returns initially have seen greater erosion in their 
profitability to the extent of negative earnings in 2009 whereas building supplies and building 
contractors have remained profitable throughout the period. For both developers and REITs, 
interest expenses, depreciation and amortization have remained fairly stable throughout the 
period. The reduction in profitability was significantly influenced by decreases in valuation of 
their assets and financial derivatives on hold, and impairment charges.  
 
The distress analysis indicates that the building materials and contractors in Australia were 
financially sound and were able to accommodate the impact of the GFC. A similar analysis 
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of contractors in Hong Kong (Chan et al. 2005) reported Z-scores falling from 2.33 in 
1997/98 to 1.41 in 2001/02 due to severe competition and reduced demand for property.  
 
Financial Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Building Material Suppliers 
Z-score 2.79 3.40 2.83 2.22 2.50 
Building Contractors  
Z-score 4.97 4.73 4.35 4.69 4.00 
Property Developers 
Z-score 1.72 2.05 1.14 0.26 1.11 
REITs 
Z-score 2.43 2.88 1.40 0.77 1.29 
Table 4  Distress analysis (weighted on revenue) 
 
Discussion of Results  
The results indicate that each of the four sectors of the building supply chain was affected to 
different extents by the GFC. The building material suppliers were the least affected 
exhibiting a 3% year-on-year drop in revenue in 2009 and another 7% drop in 2010. These 
companies remained profitable albeit at a much reduced profit margin. Net assets of these 
companies continued to grow over the entire period of study. A number of these companies 
were in the business of manufacturing products for other sectors of the economy and were 
marginally affected by the decline in construction demand in 2008. The activity ratio for these 
companies remained relatively constant over the period. These companies were moderately 
leveraged with debt, but earned sufficient revenues to cover the interest payments many 
times over. 
 
The building contractors sector exhibited increases in revenue despite the drop in total 
building starts in 2008 and the consequential drop in building volumes in 2009. This reflects 
the mode of operation of building contractors where the project duration delays the effects of 
a downturn to a couple of years after the onset of a fall in building starts. The net assets of 
the building contractors, although lowest of all four sectors, have more than doubled from 
2006 to 2010, indicating that substantial additional investments were made into these 
companies. Profit margins which were initially low at 3% to 4% were further depressed by 
the competition for jobs during the lead up to the GFC. The profit margins shown in Table 3 
for the building contractor sector were the lowest of all sectors examined. Although the profit 
margin was low, this sector remained profitable and financially liquid throughout the GFC 
period. The observed profit margin was not much different from the margin of 3.23% 
reported by Akintoye and Skitmore (1991) for an analysis of 80 general contractors in the 
UK. It also compares reasonable better than the 1% to 2% reported by Chan et al. (2005) for 
construction companies in Hong Kong immediately after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The 
ROE ratios in excess of 40% confirms the perception that construction activities require 
relatively lower amounts of equity and that operations is normally funded through judicious 
utilisation of working capital. Construction companies, though exhibiting debt ratios 
approximately 60%, are able to repay the interests on their debts from their profits. In 
general, the financial ratios indicate that they have a well-founded financial position, and are 
not directly prone to demand fluctuations are generally perceived. A recent study by Balabat 
(2011) of thirty ASX-listed construction firms operating in the civil infrastructure, residential 
and non-residential sectors reported that these firms exhibited a 25% higher growth in share 
value compared to blue chip companies and 48% higher compared to the ASX-All Ordinaries 
Index.  
 
Apparently, both the building material supplier and building contractor sectors benefitted 
from the stimulus packages once the numerous building projects commenced in earnest in 
mid- to late-2009. These sectors remained profitable and solvent, exhibited insignificant 
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changes to leverage levels; the only indication of concern was a drop in net profits and 
interest coverage.  
 
Property developers generally rely on internally generated funds and borrowings to finance 
their investment opportunities resulting in the largest net assets reported for the four sectors 
as shown in Table 2. Given that these developers in Australia were making healthy profits on 
the back of the property boom before the onset of the GFC, these companies tend to utilise 
more long-term debt to finance their business operations. Although the year-on-year falls in 
revenue between 2007 and 2009 were only 16% and 12%, respectively, a drop in the 
valuation of properties held or under-construction resulted in serious losses in 2009. Once 
the market recovered partially in 2010 and the revaluation of properties was conducted, 
these companies reported net profits and reverted to a healthy balance sheet. 
 
The REITs in Australia engage in the acquisition and ownership of property and primarily 
derive their income from rental or leasing whereas property developers are mainly involved 
in the development and management of real estate properties. Given that rental revenues 
are usually relatively stable, REITs tend to be perceived as a low risk investment vehicle. 
This study observed net profit margins in excess of 70% during 2006 and 2007, before the 
onset of the GFC, to a substantial loss of 106% of revenue reported in the 2009 financial 
year for the REITs sector. However, a revaluation of its property portfolio post-GFC resulted 
in net profit margins recovering to 37% in 2010. Although property portfolios of the 
developers and REITs were similarly assessed each financial year, the impact of any 
upward and downward swings was greater for the REITs sector than the property 
development sector. Among the sub sectors being analysed, REITs were in a much better 
situation to cover for their current liabilities with the lowest debt ratios of 0.33 to 0.36. As the 
REITs’ business risk is relatively lower than the other three sectors, these companies utilise 
more long-term debts to finance their investments in real estate. It may be worthwhile to note 
that the sample of REITs shown here have reduced the debt ratio from 0.36 in 2006 to 0.33 
in 2010. Excessive levels of gearing have magnified the steep decline in asset values for a 
number of REITs during the GFC. 
 
Conclusions 
The financial analysis of the companies operating across the building construction supply 
chain in Australia indicates that all four sectors examined were susceptible to the global 
financial crisis. From the ratio and cost structure analyses, it was evident that building 
material suppliers were the least affected as these companies have remained profitable and 
solvent throughout the period examined. These companies have benefited substantially from 
the building economic stimulus package provided by the Australian government. The impact 
on building contractors was also limited, as they have also remained profitable albeit at 
significantly reduced levels. However, there is a very high likelihood that the findings may be 
different if the study period was extended beyond 2010 as the projects let under the stimulus 
package are completed.  
 
Developers and REITs were the most affected sectors in this financial crisis where 
significant erosion in profitability was observed. The most severe drop in profitability was 
reported in 2009 when developers and REITs exhibited losses amounting to 25% and 105% 
of revenue, respectively. Decreases in the valuation of their assets and financial derivatives 
on hold, and impairment charges, have played a major role in reducing their profitability. The 
post-GFC recovery to profitability has been triggered by an increase in their asset valuation, 
more specifically, owned properties and those for sale in inventories. Since 2008, the Z-
scores for developers and REITs have fallen below the ‘distress’ level, but it was 
encouraging to see an increase from 2009 and 2010 indicating that the worse was over. The 
GFC eroded the peak market capitalisation of Australian REITs from AUD147 billion in 2007 
to its present value of AUD74 billion at the end of the 2010 financial year (ASX 2007; ASX 
2011). The steep decline of asset values during the GFC was magnified by the high gearing 
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employed by the A-REIT sector. The level of debt has reduced slightly to 0.33 in 2010 
indicating a more conservative and managed approach to gearing in this sector after the 
GFC.  
 
Post Script 
After this research project was completed, two companies in the list shown in Table 1 – 
Reed Constructions and St Hilliers Construction, were reported to be in financial distress.  
 
Reed Constructions, based in NSW, was reported to be in financial distress, with up to $80 
million of bills outstanding, despite being allocated $383.3 million under the Building the 
Education Revolution program (Moran, 2012a). On 15 June 2012, Reed Constructions 
Australia Pty Limited was placed in Voluntary Administration (Ferrier Hodgson, 2012) where 
debts were reportedly at $182.1 million after suffering losses on several other government 
contracts. On 9 July 2012, Reed Constructions was placed in the hands of a liquidator 
following a successful winding up application filed in the NSW Supreme Court by a creditor, 
SCE Group (Schlesinger, 2012). Data for Reed Constructions indicate that revenues 
increased at a compounded annual growth rate of 25% from $171 million in 2006 to $466 
million in 2011 with profit before tax at $18 million and $24 million, respectively for these two 
financial years. At the end of the 2011 financial year, net assets were at $99 million, quick 
ratio at 1.12 and the debt ratio at 0.54 indicating that the company was reasonably healthy at 
that point in time. The 2011 financial statements indicate a $47.1 million net cash outflow 
from its construction activities.  
 
St Hilliers Construction Pty Limited was placed in Voluntary Administration on 16 May 2012 
after a dispute over the funding of the $350 million Ararat Prison project that it was 
constructing under a public-private partnership approach (Zappone, 2012). It was reported 
that St Hillers Construction owed its creditors and employees a total of $121 million (Moran, 
2012b). The financial statements indicate that although the revenues increases from $347 
million in 2006 to $515 million in 2008 and declined slightly to $476 and $492 million in 2009 
and 2010, respectively, the company returned profits between $5 million and $12 million 
between 2006 to 2009. The company exhibited early signs on distress when it incurred a 
loss of nearly $18 million, before tax, for the 2010 financial year mainly due to higher 
construction costs (or conversely, lower margins). Net assets remained positive as $27 
million, but its quick ratio deteriorated to 0.54 in 2010 compared to 1.00 the previous year. It 
suffered a net cash outflow of $16.0 million in 2010 and a further $13.3 million in the 2011 
financial year.  
 
These two recent cases of financial distress is the subject of an ongoing study to further 
characterise the performance of the building and construction sector in these uncertain 
financial conditions: the results will follow in a future publication. Preliminary data seems to 
suggest that an adequate profit margin is required to provide a buffer against unforeseen 
project risks. The continued effects of the GFC will become more evident once financial 
statements and other pertinent corporate information are made available in the public 
domain. 
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